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Wetherington Cords: An Inflection Point

AN INFLECTION POINT FOR DISASTER RELIEF:
SUPERSTORM SANDY
Danshera Wetherington Cords ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

This symposium considering Superstorm Sandy (“Sandy”), the
fourth costliest hurricane in U.S. history, 1 is important as a teaching
tool and a reminder of the effects of partisan politics in disaster
recovery. The relief and recovery efforts following Sandy show the
degree to which the lessons of the early disasters of the 21st century
can be quickly forgotten.
Between 1980 and July 2019, there were 250 disasters that
caused more than $1 billion damage each, 2 which caused a total of $1.7
trillion in damages. 3 Almost 60 percent of that damage resulted from
tropical cyclones, 4 $927.5 billion through early 2019. 5
Storms
causing billions of dollars of damage are occurring more frequently. 6
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”)
estimates that the damage caused by hurricanes will increase by an
annual average of $7.3 billion per year over the next 30 years. 7

∗Professor

of Law, Albany Law School. I would like to thank the participants of the Touro
Law School faculty workshop for their helpful comments on this series of papers. I would
also like to thank Greg Kiley, Albany Law School class of 2019, for his invaluable research
assistance and Albany Law School for its financial support.
1 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Overview, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L CTRS. FOR ENVTL. INFO., https://perma.cc/L65K-BV49
[hereinafter Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Tropical cyclones are more commonly referred to as tropical storms, tropical depressions,
and tropical hurricanes.
5 Supra note 1.
6 See, e.g., Fast Facts: Climate Change Predictions, OFF. FOR COASTAL MANAGEMENT,
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://perma.cc/ZM7T-Q4X6.
7 Id.
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In 2012, Sandy caused more than $70.2 billion in damage, 8 $19
billion of that in New York City alone. 9 Damage of that magnitude
requires more resources for recovery than any one community or state
can afford. Unless we simply abandon areas hit by massive disasters,
federal intervention is necessary. Although not all people or members
of Congress support federal intervention in all cases, the use and
availability of federal disaster recovery assistance is essential
following massive disasters. In the interest of justice and equity, how
it is granted and who receives it is a question of fundamental fairness.
When federal disaster relief is required, its grant or denial should not
depend on largely partisan politics. Those who are already victims are
then pawns and often receive aid in a manner that exacerbates social
injustices and inequities.
Early in the 21st century, the rapid appropriation of federal
disaster funds was almost a given. Although the response to largescale disasters was not perfect, failures generally did not result from
partisan politics. In response to failures, the responses were studied
and examined; then changes were made in the planning process to
improve the disaster relief system, as in the case of the on the ground
response to Hurricane Katrina.
Sandy marked an inflection point in federal disaster relief. The
ground response was immediate, unlike what happened following
Katrina. Unfortunately, that was where the response faltered and
failed. Financial support failed to materialize and left residents and
households without assistance to recover in a timely manner.
Although federal relief has always been problematic between
bureaucratic limitations and an effort to balance timely payment and
fraud prevention, Sandy added the element of prolonged partisanship
to the passage of disaster relief appropriations.
Sandy demonstrated an increased politicization of federal
fiscal response to major disasters as Congress worked to pass a
supplemental appropriation to fund disaster relief. The politicization
increases the dysfunction associated with recovery, reducing the
possibility for individuals and households to return quickly to their
former lives. Studies of the response to major hurricanes making
landfall between 2005 and 2019 shows that Sandy was an inflection
point in our federal response, marking a political and social low point.
8

Id.
Emily Greenhalgh, How Sandy Affected New York’s Long-Term Planning, NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://perma.cc/46CY-AHZ6.
9
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Those who suffer the greatest harm are those who are most vulnerable.
Because at any time, any of us could be the survivor of a disaster, we
all have a vested interest in ensuring that the federal, state, and local
responses to disasters are appropriate and adequate.
Although in many instances, there has been an undercurrent in
the grant of relief that depends on whether the victims are truly
“deserving” of relief, we are all at risk. The choices we make about
disaster relief have the potential to affect us all as climate change
results in changes in disaster patterns and frequency. The social
contract theory of justice and John Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” 10 might
be a good starting point from which to build a disaster relief system.
Under Rawls’ conception of justice,
no one knows his place in society, his class position or
social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume
that the parties do not know their conceptions of the
good or their special psychological propensities. 11
Using this frame would replace post-disaster considerations of
whether a survivor deserved relief with more objective pre-disaster
criteria to determine when relief will be granted, eliminating the
potential for partisan politics as a determinative factor.
This Article discusses how recent changes made as part of
ongoing efforts to improve the federal disaster response has not
eliminated disparities of treatment among survivors, demonstrating the
continued problems with our system of ad hoc legislation for disaster
relief and recovery. This Article demonstrates that this longstanding
problem has grown worse. There were two failure points: first, the
efforts to provide immediate relief to the Sandy victims following the
storm; and second, disbursing the aid that was finally appropriated for
disaster recovery. These failure points are an inflection, marking a
movement from simply inadequate and cumbersome administrative
policies to lack of political and popular will and empathy creating
sufficient motivation to timely provide adequate financial resources
manner to allow reconstruction to proceed expeditiously.
10
11

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at 11 (1971).

Id.
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This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part II
discusses how disaster relief has evolved to create our current
expectations. This Part examines recent experiences, including the
federal appropriations following hurricanes between Katrina and
Sandy, two of the five costliest storms in U.S. history. This Part also
compares the treatment of hurricane relief to the treatment of first
responders following the terror attacks of 9/11/2001 (“9/11”). In Part
III, it discusses the appropriation and use of funds following Sandy and
explores some of the reasons for the shift in attitude regarding
appropriations and disbursement of disaster relief funds. In Part IV,
this Article considers the efforts at appropriating and using funds to
assist areas affected by the record-setting storms of 2017, Harvey and
Maria, followed by the massive storms that quickly followed in 2018.
In Part V, this Article concludes with recommendations for improving
the delivery relief.
II.

DISASTER RELIEF FUNDING

From its founding, most Americans have expected that the
government would help people recover from hardship that resulted
from events beyond the control of the victims. 12 Congress’s power to
provide disaster relief came from its power to tax and spend for the
general welfare as is necessary and appropriate. 13 It was not
uncommon for Congress to grant disaster relief. 14
Whether Congress would or should grant relief often depended
on the degree to which the victims were perceived to deserve
assistance. Whether a victim was perceived as deserving assistance
often boiled down to the manner in which the request was framed. 15
12 See, e.g., Michele Landis Dauber, “Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried By Fire’”: Disaster
Relief and the Origins of the Welfare State 1789-1984, 92 NW. L. REV. 970-73, 979 (1998)
(comparing the differences between providing disaster relief to the blameless and cases where
it was “determined that the [victim] was responsible for his situation, either by his actions or
because he somehow assumed the risk of loss.”
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
14 Dauber, supra note 12, at 973 (discussing the genesis of disaster relief as coming from
the challenges of moving to a new land with a hostile environment and indigenous people).
Many of the first Congresses’ actions were to grant relief to flood victims. Id. at 974.
15 Id. at 970. Professor Dauber traced the advent of modern welfare to disaster relief. Id.
She observes that “certain federal subsidies for needy and destitute beneficiaries who have
lost out in a ‘disaster’ have increased at the very same time that an astonishingly similar array
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Over time, our understanding of the appropriate role for the
Federal Government in disaster relief has changed dramatically. This
view has evolved, and, today people expect federal assistance
following a major disaster. Notwithstanding that expectation, federal
resources are designed to be the last available resources. 16 The Federal
Government is not responsible for all disaster relief. Primary
responsibility for disaster relief falls on state and local authorities and
their resources. The Federal Government often takes a wait-and-see
approach before determining the degree to which it will intervene
following a disaster.
More recently, there has been a further shift that has slowed the
slow of relief to victims for disaster recovery. Questions often arise
relating to the wisdom of Congressional appropriation of funds to
rebuild communities destroyed by disasters. These questions take two
forms. The first is whether areas subject to repeated disasters should
be rebuilt time and again. 17 The second is whether, in times of
increasing deficits, the Federal Government should pay for disaster
relief. 18
Debates regarding the amount and timing of resources to be
devoted to recovery from any specific disaster have become
increasingly partisan. These more prolonged and political battles have
led to public controversy. The shift in Congressional budget priorities,
which are often disconnected from the public’s view of the most
important societal needs, including that of their own constituents, has
led to major public disappointment and anger when the federal
response is seen as inadequate. As a result, the current disaster relief
funding approach requiring supplemental appropriations for major
disasters in a time of budget deficits and fiscal conservativism is likely
to lead to ongoing political battles over disaster relief.
of human needs are attributed to the moral failures of the claimants and left to their ‘personal
responsibility’ to ameliorate,” their own situation. Id. She claims this is an explanation for
today’s reluctance to grant aid following some major disasters and the relative urgency in
granting complete relief following other major disasters. Id.
16 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act §§ 401-17.
17 CONG. JT. ECON. COMM., THE NEED TO REBUILD SMARTER 1 (2017).
18 See, e.g., 165 CONG. REC. S4879 (daily ed. July 17, 2019) (statement of Mr. Paul) (“We
have a $22 trillion debt. We are adding debt at about $1 trillion a year. Therefore, any new
spending that we are approaching, any new program that is going to have the longevity of 70
or 80 years should be offset by cutting spending that is less valuable.” These statements were
part of his objections to a motion for unanimous consent to approve additional spending for
relief for first responders made sick by their actions for relief and recovery in response to the
terror attacks on 9/11/2001.)
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Following recent storms, Congressional appropriations have

Hurricane

Year

Dennis
Katrina
Rita
Wilma
Dolly
Gustav
Ike
Irene
Isaac
Sandy

2005
2005
2005
2005
2008
2008
2008
2011
2012
2012

Total
Federal
Spending
(in billions)
$0.3
$110.2
$8.7
$6.2
$0.3
$4.0
$12.3
$4.3
$1.3
$53.9

Total
Damage
(in
billions)
$3.5
$157.4
$22.4
$22.4
$1.1
$4.0
$33.7
$15.5
$3.2
$69.9

Federal
Spending
as a % of
Damage
9%
75%
39%
28%
27%
60%
36%
28%
41%
77%

As discussed below, following Sandy was the first time that a
disaster causing tens of billions of damages faced significantly delayed
Congressional appropriations to aid recovery efforts. This shift away
from nearly certain federal financial assistance, especially in the face
of what was clearly the one of the costliest natural disaster on record. 20
In part, this disconnect was driven by the presence of a new and
powerful group within the Republican party, the Tea Party caucus,
which formed during the 2010 midterm elections out of a desire to
increase fiscal responsibility. As a result of the Tea Party caucus,
19 Id. at 4. One problem in this data analysis is that the numbers do not add up. The totals
used to determine the amount of damage are not the total damage accepted by NOAA, which
is the most widely accepted source for determination of data. Even that data, as described in
its calculation methodology, acknowledges that it misses elements of the costs of natural
disaster relief and recovery. Moreover, the determination of the amount of data is not
otherwise defined. That makes this analysis of the amount of federal assistance provided in
each of these hurricanes as a percent of the damage caused suspect, as it is impossible to
determine what the investigator considered to be the appropriate measure. There are clearly
items that were included and excluded, but the analysis does not inform the reader which
should properly be considered. Therefore, it is unrealistic to apply these numbers to say that
victims of Sandy were fully funded.
20 See supra note 1.
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disaster appropriations slowed to a snail’s pace because of political
pressure to decrease spending, including to reductions in spending to
pay for disaster relief. Many members of Congress who had voted for
Katrina relief now voted against Sandy relief or at least did not push
for it. 21 This lack of assistance was also not the result of the Disaster
Relief Fund (“DRF”) running out of money, as it had in prior
emergencies. 22
A. Invoking Federal Disaster Assistance Pre-Sandy
The role of the Federal Government in disaster relief and
recovery is hotly debated. The public expects immediate federal aid
available on the ground in the immediate wake of a disaster and that it
will continue until recovery is complete. This general expectation is
somewhat undefined and leads to controversies that can be anticipated
any time vague general consensus applies without specific context and
limiting rules. Some contend that the Federal Government currently
plays too great a role in disaster response, relief, and recovery. 23 Many
have suggested that the increasing number of Presidentially declared
Major Disasters is politically motivated. 24 Moreover, as a matter of
policy, many argue that the responsibility for recovery should be

21 New York Democrat House Representative Joe Crowley was said to as have “a painful
and vivid memory of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and the refusal of some Republicans to approve
aid to victims in New York and New Jersey (several Louisiana ‘hypocrites,’ . . . voted against
Sandy
aid
but
want
Democrats
to
approve
Louisiana
aid
now.”)
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-30/the-partisan-politics-of-disaster-relief;
Aliyah Frumhin, Flashback: GOP has a history of blocking disaster aid, MSNBC, May, 22,
2013 (discussing requests for federal aid for Oklahoma tornado damage by republican
lawmakers who voted against aid packages for hurricanes, quoting Oklahoma Senator James
Inhofe as calling the Sandy aid that he voted against “totally different.”)
http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/flashback-gop-has-history-blocking-disa.
22 See, e.g., Elaine Pitman, FEMA Under Fire As Natural Disasters Pile Up, GOV’T TECH.,
Aug. 30, 2011 (discussing the hold FEMA had to put on taking applications for assistance for
repair
and
rebuilding
following
the
tornadoes
in
Joplin
eskkhttps://www.govtech.com/em/disaster/FEMA-Under-Fire-as-Natural-Disasters-PileUp.html.
23 See, e.g., Ross C. Paolino, Is It Safe to Chevron “Two-Step” in A Hurricane? A Critical
Examination of How Expanding the Government’s Role in Disaster Relief Will Only
Exacerbate the Damage, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1394 (2008); Elaine C.
Kamarck, When First Responders Are Victims: Rethinking Emergency Response, 1 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 97 (2007) (discussing the Federal Government’s role in disaster relief and as
director of disaster response).
24 BRUCE LINDSAY, CONG. RESEARCH SVC., STAFFORD ACT DECLARATIONS 1953-2016:
TRENDS, ANALYSES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS, 21-25 (2017).
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addressed entirely at the state and local level. 25 State and local
governments are in the best position to know what their citizens need
because they possess unique knowledge of the people, the area, the
challenges, and the circumstances. 26 Aid for major disasters is
expected to first come from the state, local, and tribal government
resources, including nonprofits. If the local resources are inadequate,
aid is then expected to come from federal sources. 27
Under current law, a governor or tribal leader may request
federal assistance from FEMA under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (“Stafford Act”) when
a disaster exceeds the state and local government’s capacity to
respond. 28 The FEMA director then determines whether the disaster
warrants a recommendation for the President to issue a Major Disaster

25 AMY LEPORE, THE CENTRALIZATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 3 (2017) (discussing
the application of the tension between state management and the need for federal money to
finance recovery and reconstruction following major disasters).
26 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Kent, Where’s the Cavalry?” Federal Response to 21st Century
Disasters, 40 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 181, 187 (2006) (discussing the tension between federalism
and state police power).
27 Thomas E. Drabek, Managing the Emergency Response, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 85, 85-91
(1985).
28 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. (2018).
The governor’s request for a declaration of a
presidentially declared disaster and federal assistance must be made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
5170(a) stating that “based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that
effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments
and that Federal assistance is necessary.” Id.
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Declaration (“Presidential Disaster Declaration”). 29 These procedures
are codified in the Stafford Act and the Code of Federal Regulations. 30
The President has significant discretion in making Presidential
Disaster Declarations. The process by when a President decides to
issue a Presidential Disaster Declaration is very opaque. Some
Presidential Disaster Declarations are made before the disaster actually
occurs, which allows the prepositioning of resources, including
personnel and emergency supplies. Other Presidential Disaster
Declarations are not made until after the disaster event, and the damage
can be assessed. The discretion and opacity add to the uncertainty of
relief and inequity of treatment of those affected. As discussed below,
there is also some concern that electoral politics may influence
Presidential Disaster Declarations.
To fund federal disaster relief efforts, Congress makes an
annual appropriation to the DRF as part of the budget for FEMA. This
amount is never expected to be the full amount of assistance that will
be required if there is a major disaster or if there are multiple disasters.
However, the DRF appropriations are “no-year” appropriations that
carry over to future years if unspent. However, in most years,
supplemental appropriations are required to fully fund the DRF and
meet the needs of FEMA’s obligations. Most years several
supplemental appropriations bills are introduced in Congress to
29

Id.

Id. § 5170(a).
All requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists
shall be made by the Governor of the affected State. Such a request shall
be based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude
that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the
affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary. As
part of such request, and as a prerequisite to major disaster assistance
under this chapter, the Governor shall take appropriate response action
under State law and direct execution of the State’s emergency plan. The
Governor shall furnish information on the nature and amount of State and
local resources which have been or will be committed to alleviating the
results of the disaster, and shall certify that, for the current disaster, State
and local government obligations and expenditures (of which State
commitments must be a significant proportion) will comply with all
applicable cost-sharing requirements of this chapter. Based on the request
of a Governor under this section, the President may declare under this
chapter that a major disaster or emergency exists.

30
The Presidential Disaster Declaration Process, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. ADMIN.,
http://perma.cc/F8QD-DFMZ. The process for declaring a major disaster is found in the
federal regulations. 44 CFR Part 206, Subpart B. FEMA’s recommendations are based on the
estimated damage per capita depending on the type of disaster. Per Capita Impact and Project
Thresholds, FED. EMERG. MGMT. ADMIN., FY 2019, https://perma.cc/F75P-TURY.
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provide relief following one or more disasters. 31 Unfortunately, this
structure ensures that in the wake of a major disaster, new legislation
is required. It is not at all surprising that such piecemeal legislation
has resulted in inequitable consequences to survivors of different
disasters. 32
A Presidential Disaster Declaration makes available a number
of federal disaster relief programs and resources to the citizens, states,
and local governments. Not only does it allow FEMA to coordinate
and direct the response efforts, it also provides money, supplies, and
support for the immediate needs of survivors, and it triggers the
availability of additional individual and community aid. 33
The Stafford Act 34 requires FEMA to develop a national
emergency preparedness plan in cooperation with state and local
governments, and nonprofit disaster and relief organizations, to ensure
the availability of immediate and long-term assistance following
Presidential Disaster Declarations. 35 Federal assistance for individuals
and households includes a variety of programs. First, FEMA and other
federal organizations are to ensure that individuals and households
have access to temporary housing, legal assistance, small cash grants,
and individual food grants, and low-interest Small Business
Administration (SBA) loans. 36 However, even though they carry a
31 In 2019, the following bills have been introduced through May 31, 2019: Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 2019, H.R. 268, 116th Cong. (2019) (would provide $12.1 billion to a
variety of federal agencies for numerous recent disasters); Agriculture, Rural Development,
Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2019. H.R. 265,
116th Cong. (2019) (would provide aid to farmers and increase food security in Puerto Rico);
Protecting Disaster Relief Funds Act of 2019, H.R. 1214, 116th Cong. (2019) (would protect
already appropriated disaster relief funds from being transferred or allocated to the
construction of a southern border wall); Protecting Disaster Relief Funds Act of 2019, S. 534,
116th Cong. (2019) (would protect previously appropriated disaster relief funds from being
transferred or allocated to construction of a southern border wall); Additional Supplemental
Appropriation For Disaster Relief Act of 2019, H.R. 2157, 116th Cong. (2019) (would provide
$17.2 billion to a variety of federal agencies for numerous recent disasters).
32 Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., After the Disaster: Lessons Learned About Tax Relief From
Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, 85 MISS. L. REV. 553, 593 (2016); Ellen P. Aprill & Richard
Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation: A Series of Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51,
52 (2006); Danshera Cords, Charity Begins at Home? An Exploration of the Systemic
Distortions Resulting from Post-Disaster Giving Incentives, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 213, 263-70
(2014).
33 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.
34 Pub. L. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (Nov. 23, 1988) (amended the Disaster Relief Act of
1974, Pub. L. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (May 22, 1974)).
35 42 U.S.C. § 5152(a).
36 Id. § 5170(a).
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low-interest rate, SBA loans can be problematic on a couple of levels.
First, they require that the borrower be creditworthy, which is not
always the case for disaster survivors. Second, they increase the debt
load of the borrower, which may not be sustainable, especially when
the approval and rebuilding process can be very slow.
FEMA’s community-wide programs include Public Assistance
Grants. The Public Assistance grants are made to recovery providers
including state and local governments and nonprofits that administer
the grants pursuant to FEMA standards, distributing the funds as
required under the terms of the grants for the benefit of the
community. 37 Public Assistance grants can be used for debris removal,
repair and replacement of publicly-owned facilities and the repair,
restoration, or replacement of facilities owned or operated by a
nonprofit. 38 Public assistance grants require a local cost share of up to
25 percent, although the cost-share can be lowered or waived. 39
FEMA can also make community disaster loans to local governments
that have lost a significant portion of their tax revenue. 40
The Department of Housing and Urban Development makes
Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) for the recovery of
communities. CDBG for disaster recovery can be used for disaster
relief, long-term recovery, the restoration of infrastructure, housing,
and economic revitalization. 41 The Federal Government is generally
expected these projects.
These are only a few of the programs that are available. In
addition, many of them are operated by FEMA, but disaster relief is
also conducted through many other agencies, including the Coast
Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. The variety of programs and
agencies involved in disaster relief makes it hard to determine the aid
that is available, the amount that has been used, and the amount that
has actually been paid to survivors. Moreover, the federal response to
natural disasters has never been perfect.

37
38
39
40
41

Id. § 5172.
42 U.S.C.§ 5172.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5172, 5173, 5189.
42 U.S.C. § 5184. Percentage and dollar limitations apply. Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5321.
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Politics may affect whether the President is willing to make a
Presidential Disaster Declaration. 42 Politics also affects whether funds
are appropriated to pay for disaster relief. As discussed above, a
Presidential Disaster Declaration is necessary to trigger the availability
of federal disaster relief resources. In some cases, including landfall
of one of these storms, a Presidential Disaster Declaration is almost a
foregone conclusion, although the timing of the declaration is
important. However, even following the declaration, presidential
politics remain important as the threat of a veto for a disaster relief
appropriation may hold up legislation. 43
For these programs to be available beyond the minimum DRF
appropriation, Congress must appropriate additional funds. Spending
decisions are always political and always involve compromise. A vote
to support a spending bill by one legislator now will be expected to
garner reciprocal support in the future, which may also be in the
interest of the legislator’s constituents.
Spending became even more political as budget deficits began
to increase. Rising concerns about the sustainability of deficit
spending and the level of the national debt led to the enactment of the
Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). 44 Among other things, the BCA
provided a discretionary spending cap on disaster spending at 10

The number of Presidential Disaster Declarations fluctuates, with the number of requests
that are turned down in relation to the election cycle being 23.1 percent in years preceding a
presidential election, 24.2 percent in presidential election years, 26.6 percent in the year
following a presidential election, and 26.4 percent in a midterm election year. When viewed
solely in terms of the presidential election cycle, the number of Presidential Disaster
Declaration requests that are turned down remains at 24.2 percent in the year of a presidential
election and averages 25.3 percent in all other years. Bruce R. Lindsay, CONG. RES. SVC.,
STAFFORD ACT DECLARATIONS 1953-2016: TRENDS, ANALYSES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONGRESS, 22 (2017) (The averages are for the years between 1974 and 2016, and are
calculated using the data from U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency
Management
Agency,
Presidential
Disaster
Declarations,
available
at
https://fema.gov/disasters.).
43 Erica Werner & Jeff Stein, Disaster aid stalls in Senate amid fight over Puerto Rico,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2019, at A5; Emergency Aid May Trump Veto, ENG. NEWS-REC., May
17, 1999, Vol. 242, No. 19, p. 13. (“presidential veto threats hanging over an
emergency disaster relief and foreign assistance bill are prompting House and Senate
negotiators to craft a bill that contains no extraneous measures.”); Veto Threat Looms Over
Disaster Bill, CHIC. SUN-TIMES, June 5, 1997, at News 22, (“The Republicans, ignoring the
veto threat, said they would attempt to rush the measure through the House and Senate today
and send it to the White House.”).
44 The Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, §§ 101-103 125 Stat. 240
(amending the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA)).
42
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percent below the average of the funding over the previous 10 years,
excluding the highest and lowest years. 45
Spending on disaster relief is particularly fraught because, in
many ways, all disasters are inherently local. Some areas are
particularly prone to particular disasters such as flooding in Louisiana
and wildfires and earthquakes in Southern California. No area is
completely immune to disasters. Therefore, any approach that denies
federal relief to one area that is devastated beyond the capacity of state
and local resources puts all other areas in the future at risk because of
the lack of past cooperation.
This is apparent from the degree to which major disaster
spending has become a political hot potato. 46 When, whether, and how
much federal relief will be granted has become a matter subject to
much political debate.
A significant factor in the ultimate
determination of long-term aid seems to be the attention the disaster
garners in the media, resulting in public calls for support. Because of
their cataclysmic nature and the fact that was no major media event
occurred close on their heels, Hurricane Katrina and the 9/11 terrorist
attacks remained in the news cycle much longer than most events.
Both events warranted huge outpourings of support, but
perhaps for different reasons. Both involved shocking devastation and
human suffering. Congressional disaster relief was relatively rapid
following these events. 9/11 garnered enormous media attention
because of the horrifying nature of the event; the federal disaster relief
efforts demonstrated initial successes that did not last.
Katrina reflected failures from the beginning to the end. The
state and federal level responses were woefully inadequate, resulting
in the increased media attention, and the relatively rapid Congressional
appropriations. Subsequent changes in disaster relief also appear to be
a reactive response. As discussed below, such changes appear to be
normal. Discretionary Presidential Disaster Declarations, disaster-bydisaster
Congressional
appropriations,
and
discretionary
disbursements result in the inequities that make up our current disaster
relief system. Sandy relief marked an inflection point where the
appropriation process failed, requiring fundamental reform.

The Budget Control Act §103(2), amending BBEDCA §254(e).
See generally, Gregory W. Meeks, A Storm in Congress: How Partisanship Impacts
Disaster Response, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 447 (2016).
45
46

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 [2019], Art. 4

938

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

The treatment of victims of 9/11 over time also illustrates this
paradigm shift. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George
W. Bush stated in his address to America:
Our first priority is to get help to those who have
been injured, and to take every precaution to protect our
citizens at home and around the world from further
attacks. . . . Tonight, I ask for your prayers for all those
who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been
shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has
been threatened. . . . This is a day when all Americans
from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice
and peace. . . . None of us will ever forget this day. Yet,
we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good
and just in our world. 47
Volunteers were immediately on the scene from every
imaginable agency at the local, state, and federal levels. Federal
financial assistance flowed freely.
President Bush’s words, and the immediate outpouring of local
and humanitarian support, coupled with Congressional action,
reflected the best example of disaster relief. People who were injured
in the attacks, including first responders, and the families of those who
were killed, received prompt attention and substantial aid.
In recent days, we have continued to show this reluctance to
provide equitable support for victims of mega-disasters. The victims
of the September 11, 2011 terror attacks (9/11) provide a microcosm
of this shift over time. 48 The immediate victims of the 9/11 terror
attacks received very generous support from both charitable and
government sources vis-á-vis victims of other disasters. 49 The
President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation (Sept.
11,
2001),
available
at
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html.
48 It is possible that a case can be made that these victims may be differently situated and
not entitled to equivalent treatment because of the passage of time, issues of causation, and
causes of death and injury. However, this Article is not going to address those arguments or
positions. My position is that all victims of all disasters should be treated equitably, as is
discussed throughout.
49 Charitable contributions to the 35 largest charitable organizations to assist 9/11 victims
and their families quickly topped $2.7 billion. Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python, How the
Charitable Response to 9/11 Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251,
252 (2003) (citing U.S. General Accounting Off., September 11: More Effective Collaboration
47
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immediate victims received better treatment than those first responders
and law enforcement personnel who spent time in the aftermath sorting
through the debris to aid survivors and their families. 50 Victims and
their families also received payments from the government through the
9/11 Victim Compensation Fund (VCF), which was created by
Congress to compensate victims and their families in exchange for a
waiver of their right bring tort claims. 51 Each claimant received an
average of $1.5 million, tax-free. 52 The award from the VCF was
offset by amounts received from collateral sources, which included
insurance, but not charitable sources. 53
Although first responders began dying in 2006, it was not until
2010 that Congress ultimately passed the James Zadroga 9/11 Health
and Compensation Act , to provide health care and compensation for
injuries suffered by first responders. 54 In 2015, this coverage was
extended. 55 Then, in February 2019, the 9/11 Victim Compensation
Fund, announced that it was running out of money and claims would

Could Enhance Charitable Organizations’ Contributions in Disasters, GAO-03-259 at 7-8
(Dec. 2002). This was more than could spent provide for the immediate and long-term general
welfare of those individuals. Historically, charitable disaster relief organizations have limited
their support for victims to that amount of money or services necessary to provide for the
general welfare and needs of the victims, to avoid problems associated with maintaining their
tax-exempt status because they have provided a private benefit. Id. at 251, 254.
50 Id.
51 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401-409,
115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101. See generally Kenneth R.
Feinberg, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001: Policy and Precedent, 56
N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 1115 (2011/2012) (reflections on the fund and its administration by the fund
administrator 10 years after its creation).
52 Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism - and Crime, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 268, 327 (2003) (citing Department of Justice, Compensation for Deceased Victims;
Award
Payment
Statistics
tbl.1,
at
http://
www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments_deceased.html (reporting median award as of
Apr. 12, 2004 to be $1,435,349); Martha Chamallas, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51,
79 (2003) (citing an interview with Kenneth Feinberg, American Morning (CNN television
broadcast, Sept. 11, 2003)).
53 28 C.F.R. 104. See also Katz, supra note 60, at 589 (2003) (discussing the decision not
to offset fund awards by receipts from charitable organizations and application of that rule).
54 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 124
Stat. 3623 (reactivating the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund, which had closed in
2003. It expanded health coverage and compensation, setting aside $2.775 billion for first
responders and individuals suffering health effects as a result of the terror attacks.).
55 James Zadroga 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2996.
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be paid at a rate of 70 percent or less than earlier claims. 56 This reflects
the decreasing political and social will to provide aid to victims and
survivors the further in the past the disaster becomes relative to the
current need. Finally, in July 2019, legislation was enacted that would
fund 9/11 first responder health care and compensation in perpetuity.57
This is just another example of a collective reduction in
concern for victims of mass tragedies. The immediate response to this
announcement has been public and political outrage. 58 However, it is
another example of how an ad hoc federal legislative response is
resulting in disparate treatment of a vulnerable population now. In this
case, we can compare apples to apples, first responders, and survivors
whose health was affected at ground zero pre-Sandy to those who have
discovered that post-Sandy.
These inequities and the failures in the responses to these
disasters result in large part from the manner in which federal
responses are structured. Because disaster relief requires supplemental
appropriations and is not funded on a continuing basis, the survivors
and their communities are at the mercy of the current Congress.
The waning enthusiasm for the continued care of the first
responders emphasizes the need to ensure ample, certain aid on the
occurrence of major disasters like Sandy. Without certainty, Congress
and the public may come to feel fatigued. Certain relief will prevent
survivors, unlike the late-diagnosed first responders, and the still
suffering Sandy survivors, from finding out many years later that there
still is no help available.

Rupa Bhattacharyya, Message from Special Master Rupa Bhattacharyya (Feb. 15, 2019)
(explaining the number of claims awarded, the number of anticipated future claims, the
amount remaining in the fund, and the resulting need to reduce future payments),
https://www.vcf.gov/blogprogstatsfeb2019.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019), available at
https://perma.cc/532P-FXAC see also Reuters, U.S. Slashes Payouts From 9/11 Victims Fund,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019) (explaining that the special master deemed the reduction in
payouts was necessary because the $7.375 billion fund had only $2.375 billion remaining,
which was insufficient to compensate all of the additional victims and their families at the
original rate).
57 Never Forget the Heroes: James Zadroga, Ray Pfeifer, and Luis Alvarez Permanent
Authorization of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Act of 2019, Pub. L. No.
116-34,
58 Shannon Van Sant, Sept. 11 Victim Compensation Fund Cuts Payouts By As Much As 70
Percent, NPR (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/16/695481252/9-11-victimscompensation-fund-cuts-payouts-by-as-much-as-70-percent (quoting Senator Kirsten
Gillibrand as stating that she and Senator Corey Booker would be introducing legislation to
“ensure that the men and women injured by the toxins at Ground Zero are never forgotten”).
56
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Pre-Sandy Storm Response

Prior to Sandy, FEMA’s storm response record was weak.
Hurricane Katrina (“Katrina”) was perhaps FEMA’s greatest failure.
Katrina’s U.S. landfall on August 29, 2005, 59 resulted in massive
devastation that was exacerbated by the breach of the levees on Lake
Pontchartrain. The federal response to Katrina was woefully
inadequate, sparking both domestic and international outrage. State
officials and FEMA failed to preposition adequate supplies and first
responders. 60 Evacuation and shelter plans were inadequate and
poorly executed. Communications failed. The world watched 24/7
news coverage as victims suffered, trapped in New Orleans. 61 The
suffering was massive, caused the evacuation of millions, the
displacement of more than 400,000 people, and destroyed more than
300,000 homes. 62
The immediate inadequacy of the response was blamed on the
ineptitude of the leadership at FEMA, racism, and lack of concern for
those living in poverty. 63 Despite that, President Bush said of the
FEMA director, Michael Brown, “Brownie, you’re doing
a heckuva job.” 64

59 RICHARD D. KNABB, JAMIE R. RHOME, AND DANIEL P. BROWN, NAT’L. HURRICANE CTR.,
NAT’L. OCEANIC ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT HURRICANE KATRINA 2330 AUGUST 2005, 29-32 (2006) https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005_Katrina.pdf.

Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 522 (2007).
60

61 See, e.g., Eye of the Storm That Forced a City to Flee, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Australia),
August 30, 2005 (describing the evacuation to the Superdome in anticipation of Katrina);
Julian Borger, Aftermath of Katrina: “It’s like a war zone here. There was shooting and
looting,” Sept. 1, 2005, THE GUARDIAN, 3 (describing the reports of conditions at the
Superdome in New Orleans, where those who were not evacuated were trapped; the conditions
were inhumane and dangerous and captured the attention of the world, garnering offers of
donations and aid from governments and citizens everywhere); Adam Harvey, Stee Gee and
Luke McIlveen, Tales Of Rape Terror And Escape From A Savage City - Hurricane Katrina,
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Australia), Sept. 3, 2005, World 3; Nabi Abdullaev, Rescue Teams
Waiting to Help Hurricane Victims, Sept. 5, 2005, MOSCOW TIMES, NO. 3245.
62 CONG. RES. SVC., FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, RITA,
WILMA, GUSTAV, AND IKE, R43139, 3 (2019).
63 While later admitting that the response to Katrina was inadequate, President George W.
Bush denied claims that the response failures were a result of racism. See, e.g., No Racism in
Katrina Response, Bush Says; Judge Orders FEMA to Extend Hotel Stays, CHI. TRIB. 11 (Dec.
13, 2005) (quoting President Bush saying that “You can call me anything you want, but do
not call me a racist” during “NBC Nightly News.”).
64 Andrew Zajac & Andrew Martin, Top FEMA Leaders Short on Experience, CHI. TRIB. 4
(Sept. 7, 2005).
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Many studies were done that attempted to pinpoint the failures
and ensure that such an error would not recur. 65 Katrina caused over
$125 billion in damage, and no one understood why the Federal
Government and FEMA responded so inadequately.
It would have been unthinkable for Congress to have failed to
provide immediate financial relief to the survivors. Congress
introduced and passed, with the President’s support, the first
supplemental appropriation for disaster relief spending on September
2, 2005, just four days after landfall. This appropriation provided
$10.5 billion for initial relief efforts. 66 Everyone understood that this
was a drop in the bucket compared to what would be needed, but it was
the first step to help the victims. Six days later, Congress appropriated
another $51.8 billion. 67
Further relief was slowed because of concerns about federal
and state preparation and response. Paying for federal recovery
assistance certainly had political implications. At a Congressional
hearing, Republican Rep. Henry Bonilla of Texas told Mississippi
Governor Haley Barbour that “Members of Congress are hearing from
constituents saying, ‘We’re really not interested in you supporting any
additional relief until there’s some real strong accountability.’” 68
Nonetheless, more funds were appropriated as New Orleans is an
important economic engine because of its busy international port at the
mouth of the Mississippi River.
In December 2005, 91 days after Katrina made landfall,
Congress approved a presidential request to reallocate Department of
Defense appropriations for use in Katrina recovery. 69 Although the
65 See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS ENHANCED
LEADERSHIP, CAPABILITIES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY CONTROLS WILL IMPROVE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATION’S PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY SYSTEM, GAO06-618 (2006); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HURRICANE KATRINA BETTER PLANS AND
EXERCISES NEEDED TO GUIDE THE MILITARY’S RESPONSE TO CATASTROPHIC NATURAL
DISASTERS, GAO-06-043 (2006); THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA LESSONS
LEARNED (2006) (prepared for the White House by the Department of Homeland Security),
https://perma.cc/3JZM-425W; LYNN E. DAVIS, JILL ROUGH, ET AL., RAND CORP., HURRICANE
KATRINA:
LESSONS
FOR
ARMY
PLANNING
AND
OPERATIONS
(2007)
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG603.pdf.
66 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Meet Immediate Needs Arising From the
Consequence of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-61, 119 Stat. 1988 (Sept. 2, 2005).
67 Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs Arising
from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, 119 Stat. 1990 (Sept.
8, 2005).
68 Governor Faults Congress on Katrina Funds, ST. LOUIS POST-GAZ. A4 (Dec. 8, 2005).
69 Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680.
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total appropriations were substantially less than the estimates of the
damage or even the short-term needs, the aid was appropriated at a
record pace. A substantial portion of this appropriation was earmarked
to provide for the immediate needs of the victims and the cost of
evacuation, rescue, and relief services.
Ultimately, Congress
appropriated approximately $120 billion in Katrina relief and
recovery. 70
The relief efforts continued to fail. Five years later, in 2009,
31,500 households still considered themselves to be in transition and
not permanently settled. 71 This was approximately seven percent of
the New Orleans population. 72
In the fall of 2005, Hurricanes Rita and Wilma made landfall
in the Southeastern U.S., causing tens of billions of dollars more
damage. Rita and Wilma caused approximately $18.5 billion and $19
billion in damage, respectively, making them the tenth and ninth
costliest hurricanes on record. 73 They struck an already devastated
area, further straining resources, but receiving a much more robust
response, even though Rita’s landfall on September 24, 2005, was just
under a month after Katrina.
The relief failures exhibited in response to Katrina
demonstrated that changes were clearly needed. Both the Federal

70 FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE, supra note 62. In addition to providing billions of
dollars in direct relief, Congress also provided temporary tax relief and benefits to victims,
their employers, and their charitable benefactors. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GO
Zone Act), Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577, 2596-98 (codified at scattered sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended) (providing limited tax relief benefitting victims
of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma and their benefactors); Katrina Emergency Tax Relief
Act of 2005 (KETRA), Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016, 2027 (Sept. 23, 2005) (codified in
scatted sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended) (providing limited tax
relief benefitting victims of Hurricane Katrina and their benefactors). To the extent that the
tax provisions benefited the victims or were sound policy, there has been much debate.
Cords, Charity Begins at Home? An Exploration of the Systemic Distortions Resulting from
Post-Disaster Giving Incentives, supra note 32; Cords, Charitable Contributions
for Disaster Relief: Rationalizing Tax Consequences and Victim Benefits, supra note 32;
Tolan, supra note 32, at 829-35); Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 32, at 53-56 (2006).
71 Kimberly A. Geaghan, Forced to Move: An Analysis of Hurricane Katrina Movers 2009
American Housing Survey: New Orleans, SEHSD Working Paper Number 2011‐17, U.S.
Census Bureau, 6 (2011) https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/workingpapers/2011/demo/SEHSD-WP2011-17.pdf.
72 Id. These households had a median income of $25,000, were primarily minorities, and
reported occupying an average of 5 residences during the 5 years since Katrina. Id. at 6-7.
73 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, supra note 1.
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Government 74 and many states 75 have worked to change their
emergency management structures. Although the response to
subsequent disasters has not been not flawless, during the 2008 storm
season, Hurricanes Gustav and Ike both made landfall on the Gulf
Coast causing numerous deaths and billions of dollars of damage. Ike
and Gustav are the sixth and the nineteenth costliest hurricanes to make
landfall in the U.S. having caused $30 billion and $6 billion of damage,
respectively. 76 The Gulf Coast area was better prepared for landfall;
mandatory evacuation orders were issued and heeded. 77 The Federal
Government made an emergency appropriation for relief and recovery
for Gustav within four weeks of landfall and Ike within just over two
weeks of its landfall. 78
In addition to providing direct appropriations for relief and
recovery within weeks of landfall, Congress also provided a variety of
temporary tax relief measures for individuals, households, and

See, e.g., Post–Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, 109th Cong., Pub.
L. No. 109–295, 120 Stat. 1394 (Oct. 4, 2006) (codified in scattered sections of titles 6 and 42
of the U.S.C.).
75 Sharona Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the Most Vulnerable in
Emergencies, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1491, 1547 (2009) (citing Legal and Regulatory Issues
24 (2006), HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
(ESAR-VHP)).
76 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, supra note 1.
77 See, e.g., Adam Nossiter & Graham Bowler, Hurricane Gustav Makes Landfall on
Louisiana
Coast
N.Y.
Times,
Sept.
1,
2008,
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/01/world/americas/01ihtstorm.1.15793587.html?searchResultPosition=10 (visited Aug. 8, 2019).
78 Following Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008, the initial additional appropriations were
slightly slower, but much more generous, it was twenty-nine days after Hurricane Gustav
made landfall on Sept. 1, 2008, and seventeen days after Hurricane Ike made landfall on
September 13, 2008 that the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and
Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574 (2008) was
enacted. However, the delay in making a supplemental appropriation following Hurricane
Gustav may not be as significant, as it was much smaller than many of those that we are
discussing, having caused $6 billion, making it relatively small in comparison to some of these
other hurricanes – which is not to say that it was by any means insignificant or did not require
additional resources, just that there may have been adequate resources available in the days
that followed landfall and three weeks may not have been unreasonable. In contrast, Hurricane
Ike caused $30 billion in damage, requiring significant immediate resources, therefore a $40
billion disaster relief appropriation approximately two weeks (17 days) after landfall was a
rapid response that provided substantial resources critical to relief and recovery efforts for
both hurricanes.
74
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businesses that were affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, and
Ike. 79 These were relatively generous relief packages.
On August 27, 2011, almost exactly 6 years after Katrina made
landfall, Hurricane Irene made landfall on the coast of North Carolina,
swept up through New York, and into the Northeast. 80 The federal
response bore almost no resemblance to that in the lead up to and
following Katrina: there was an early declaration of a disaster,
closures, and evacuations. In fact, some claimed there was an
overreaction. Chad Sweet, Chief of Staff to former Secretary of
Department Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, said: “Who would
have thought, here we are, six years later, and instead of debating
failures, we’re debating being overprepared?” 81 Causing $13.5 billion
in damages, Irene was one of the ten costliest hurricanes in U.S.
history. 82
There were initial concerns about FEMA funding because
FEMA had less than $800 million left in its budget for the fiscal year,
which was not over until September 30, 2011, more than a month
later. 83 On August 28, 2011, Congress had passed the Fiscal Year 2012
FEMA Budget; Congress had included $1 billion more than President
Obama had requested. 84 On September 1, 2011, before the floodwaters
had fully receded, the Obama administration submitted its Report on
Disaster Relief Funding, as required by the Budget Control Act, that
Congress had passed in August. 85 The report stated that additional
disaster relief funding would be needed. Not only was there Irene
recovery to pay for but four other major disasters had also occurred in

Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2016 (2006)
(Katrina); Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577 (2006)
(Katrina, Rita, Wilma); Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §
702, 122 Stat. 2765 (2009) (extending the temporary relief available to victims of Katrina,
Rita and Wilma to victims of Ike).
80 Nat’l Weather Svc., Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Hurricane Irene, August
26-27, 2011, https://www.weather.gov/mhx/Aug272011EventReview.
81 Six Years After Katrina, Praise for Irene Response, CNN.com, https://perma.cc/FGW5SXT4.
82 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, supra note 1.
83 Carl Hulse, Federal Austerity Changes Disaster Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011)
(discussing the conservatives’ resistance to increase deficit spending for disaster relief without
decreasing spending somewhere else).
84 Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-175, 126 Stat. 1313.
85 OFF. MGMT. AND BUDGET, OMB REP. ON DISASTER RELIEF FUNDING TO THE COMM. ON
APPROPRIATIONS AND BUDGET OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE (Sept. 1,
2011), https://perma.cc/UBR9-EFZZ.
79
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2011. 86 In December, Congress passed a supplemental disaster relief
appropriation for $6.4 billion. 87
III.

SANDY RESPONSE

Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012, near Atlantic City,
New Jersey. 88 It was the fourth costliest hurricane in U.S. history,
causing $70 billion in damage. The focus of its damage was in New
York, New Jersey, and ten other northeast states. 89 Sandy’s potential
for death and property destruction was substantially reduced because
its intensity had fallen to a Category 1 hurricane at the time of landfall.
It still caused massive flooding, immense property damage, and an
enormous interruption of national commerce. Sandy caused extended
closures of the New York City airports, the subways and trains, the
New York Stock Exchange, and damaged or destroyed 650,000 homes
and damaged or closed tens of thousands of businesses. 90 Sandy
caused intermittent power grid failures for days. 91
As was the case after Katrina, after Sandy, many raised
concerns about how efficiently the Federal Government, and
particularly FEMA, responded to victims’ needs. FEMA had
prepositioned food and medical supplies at strategic points prior to
landfall to avoid the on-the-ground problems it experienced during and
following Katrina. 92 This made the immediate response more efficient
and effective than it had been for Katrina. However, the recovery
phase showed much less improvement. It started with appropriations
and is still ongoing.
Sandy marked a severe shift in Congressional funding for
disaster relief. Ninety-one days elapsed before Congress passed a
86

Id.
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-77, 125 Stat. 1277 (2011).
88 Hurricane Sandy, NAT’L WEATHER SVC., NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
(Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.weather.gov/okx/HurricaneSandy.
89 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, supra note 1.
90 HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING STRATEGY, HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK
FORCE,
DEPT.
OF
HOUSING
AND
URB.
DEV.,
13
(2013)
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HSREBUILDINGSTRATEGY.PDF.
91 James M. Van Nostrand, Keeping the Lights on During Superstorm Sandy: Climate
Change Adaptation and the Resiliency Benefits of Distributed Generation, 23 N.Y.U. ENVIR.
L.J. 92, 96 (2015).
92 Steve Vogel, Officials and Experts Praising FEMA for Its Response to Hurricane Sandy,
Nov. 1, 2012, WASH. POST; Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Lipton, A Chance to Show Progress
at FEMA, Oct. 30, 2012, N.Y. TIMES, A23.
87
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$50.7 billion appropriations bill,93 far longer than it took for Congress
to respond to prior or subsequent storms. As discussed above,
following Katrina, the first appropriation of disaster relief funds was
made four days after Katrina made landfall, 94 twenty-nine days after
Gustav, 95 seventeen days after Ike, 96 and just over two months after
Irene, which hit just before the beginning of the new fiscal year. 97
Six years after Sandy, some survivors remain displaced, and
recovery efforts continue. Of the 2013 appropriation, $42 billion was
subject to sequestration as a result of the government shutdown. 98 This
funding was subject to sequester in 2013 under the Budget Control Act
of 2011, which reduced the total appropriation available to about $48
billion.99
Although there was praise for the immediate storm response
following Sandy, the recovery efforts were abysmal. 100 Not only were
Congressional appropriations of disaster relief incredibly slow to
come, but FEMA was slow to award and make recovery payments. As
of August 2014, less than one-quarter of the $48 billion available funds
appropriated for disaster assistance had been paid out, and only $19
billion had been obligated or awarded. 101 In a survey of victims in the
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut area, conducted by a communitybased aid organization, 39 percent of all households responded that
one year later their homes had not yet been fully repaired, with that
rate increasing to 50 percent among all low-income respondent and all
93 Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–2, 127 Stat. 4 (Jan. 29,
2013); see also Bruce R. Lindsay & Justin Murray, Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster
Assistance: Summary Data and Analysis, 4, CRS R43665 (Oct. 1, 2014).
94 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
95 See supra note 78.
96 Id.
97 See supra note 88, and accompanying text.
98 Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, Final Sequestration Report to the President and Congress for
Fiscal
Year
2013,
4,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/sequ
estration/sequestration_final_april2013.pdf.
99 Pub. L. 112-25, 125 Stat. 40 (Jan. 4, 2011) (requiring sequestration of appropriations in
excess of discretionary spending limit). OFF. OF MMGT. AND BUDGET, FINAL SEQUESTRATION
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, 8,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/sequ
estration/sequestration_final_april2013.pdf.
100 Steve Vogel, Officials and Experts Praising FEMA for Its Response to Hurricane Sandy,
WASH. POST, (Nov. 1, 2012); Michael S. Schmidt and Eric Lipton, A Chance to Show Progress
at FEMA, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012), A23.
101 A Long Path to Recovery, Nat’l Ctr. for Disaster Recovery (Oct. 29, 2014) (citing the
Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board for Hurricane Sandy Funding).
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renter respondent households. 102 More than a year later, more than
30,000 residents of New York were still unable to return to their
homes, and over half of the people who had requested aid from FEMA
had not received it. 103 Five years after Sandy, thousands of
homeowners who had been approved for recovery grants were still
waiting to receive their grant so that they could complete the repair
work and return home. 104 In March 2015, less than one-third of the
funds appropriated, $15 billion, had been paid out. 105 Even today,
funds that are obligated have not been paid, and it is difficult to
determine how much of the appropriations have been committed. 106
IV.

POST-SANDY DISASTER RESPONSE

The 2017 storm season saw three of the five costliest storms in
U.S. history make landfall: Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The
federal response showed increased politicization, but also more
immediacy. As discussed below, the inflection marked by the
response to Sandy may reflect a dangerous tipping point that requires
immediate action to prevent further disadvantage to future victims.
Hurricane Harvey made landfall on August 25, 2017, in
Houston, Texas. It caused estimated damage of $125 billion.107
Harvey is now tied for the second-costliest hurricane on record. 108
Houston is home to one of the most important oil export ports, perhaps
increasing its perceived importance in the U.S. economy, and creating
a strong political incentive to ensure minimal disruption from the
102 Research Brief, Hurricane Sandy: Housing Needs One Year Later, Enterprise
Community Partners (Oct. 2013) (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), http://perma.cc/9LKL-QUV3.
103 Meeks, supra note 56, at 448.
104 Amy S. Rosenberg and Frank Kummer, Hurricane Sandy, Five Years Later: People Living
In Cars And Other Realities Of A Slow-Moving Recovery, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://perma.cc/5E8V-XFAD; Bridget Downes & Anthony Rifilato, Hurricane Sandy, Five
Years On, LI HERALD (Oct. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/VNP9-VC3G.
105 Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board for Hurricane Sandy Funding, Final
Report to Congress on Activities Related to Hurricane Sandy Funds, 2 (May 2015),
http://perma.cc/5W8W-TFJN.
106 Appropriations were spread across numerous agencies. Within FEMA the funds were
allocated to numerous Presidential Disaster Declarations, and each Presidential Disaster
Declaration has its own tracking of expenses and commitments. See, e.g., FEMA, New Jersey
Hurricane Sandy (DR-4086), http://perma.cc/LQ2B-FFXZ; FEMA, New York Hurricane
Sandy (DR-4085), http://perma.cc/TU3Q-A4GT; FEMA, West Virginia Hurricane Sandy
(DR-4093), http://perma.cc/HGY2-PUYC.
107 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, supra note 1..
108 Id.
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storm as possible. 109 In Houston, more than 200,000 people were
displaced. 110
At the same time, of the 24 Texas counties hit by Harvey, those
experiencing property damage were disproportionately minority and
lower-income residents. 111 The 24 Texas counties in the Gulf Coast
region that experienced the greatest property damage were
disproportionately minority and lower-income residents. 112
Congress quickly appropriated $15.25 billion for Harvey relief
two weeks after landfall. 113
Hurricane Irma made landfall in the U.S. Virgin Islands on
September 6, before arriving in Florida on September 10, 2017. Irma
became the fifth costliest hurricane in U.S. history, with estimated
damages of $50 billion. 114 It was followed on September 20th by
Hurricane Maria.
Maria made landfall on Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017, as
a category 4 hurricane. It is the third costliest hurricane in U.S.
history. 115 The damage estimate is $90 billion. 116 FEMA had diverted
many of the prepositioned relief resources for use in Irma, making
fewer resources available for victims of Maria in Puerto Rico. In
addition, having been hit with so many large hurricanes, in such a short
period of time, resources were spread thin. Maria caused at least 2,975
deaths in Puerto Rico 117 and left 35 percent of the island’s population
109 See, e.g., Akin Oyedele, Hurricane Harvey Could Be the Costliest Natural Disaster In
US History — Here’s How We’ll Know the True Cost, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/hurricane-harvey-economic-impact-2017-8.
110 The Atlantic Hurricane Season and The Importance of Resilience, GLOBAL REPORT ON
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 2018, 42, 43 (2019) http://perma.cc/D3W4-.
111 Kaiser Permanente Foundation & Episcopal Health Foundation, An Early Assessment
of Hurricane Harvey’s Impact on Vulnerable Texans in the Gulf Coast Region 5-7 (December
2017)
(reporting
on
a
representative
sample
survey)
http://www.houstontx.gov/postharvey/public/documents/12.2017_ehf_kff_harvey_survey.pd
f.
112 Id.
113 Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster
Relief Requirements Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-56, 131 Stat. 1129 (Sept. 8, 2017).
114 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, supra note 1.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Ascertainment of the Estimated Excess Mortality from Hurricane María, MILKEN INST.
SCHOOL OF PUB. HEALTH AT GEORGE WASH. UNIV., https://perma.cc/QLJ7-DGUM, 9 (last
visited Aug. 8, 2018) (this study was commissioned by the governor of Puerto Rico and
estimate was made using an excess death model. Another longitudinal study concluded that
the death toll from Maria could be as high as 4645. Nishant Lishore et al., Mortality in Puerto
Rico After Maria, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED., Vol. 2, 2018, 162, 167. This study was based on
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without power four months after Maria. 118 Although congressional
and public outcries for relief and recovery efforts are strong,
presidential reluctance to get involved, coupled with repeated
presidential threats to withdraw already promised aid put communities
at growing risk. The island of Puerto Rico has an incredibly high
poverty rate; more than 40 percent of the population lives in poverty,
compared to 14 percent of the population on the mainland United
Although $91 billion in disaster relief has been
States. 119
appropriated, 120 only a fraction of that has been disbursed. 121
Victims of Hurricane Maria, the third costliest hurricane on
record, 122 have received far less political support than victims of any
surveys and review of death certificates; researchers noted that they did not have access to all
information. Id. After being given access to the Puerto Rico Demographic Registry, which
they did not have during their initial study, they revised their estimate to 3,433 deaths
attributable to Hurricane María in the 200 days between September 20, 2017 and April 15,
2018. Id.; see also José A. Delgado Robles, Harvard University Researchers Affirm that
There Were 3,433 Excess Deaths, ENDI ELNUEVODIA.COM (English version) (Sept. 9, 2018),
https://perma.cc/DGTJ-78X9. As of April 15, 2018, the researchers concluded that the death
rate had normalized. Id. One of the researchers, Professor Rafael Irizarry, attributes the higher
death count in the Harvard study than the George Washington study to the longer time span
covered by the Harvard study and Harvard’s access to the Demographic Registry. Id. Puerto
Rico changed its official death count to reflect the number determined in this study within
hours of its release. Sheri Fink, Nearly a Year After Puerto Rico Revises Death Toll to 2975,
N.Y. TIMES, A1 (Sept. 13, 2018). Although Puerto Rico has made the higher number its
official death count, President Donald J. Trump denied that the higher numbers was accurate,
that they reflect an effort by the democrats “to make me [Trump] look as bad as possible.”
Philip Rucker, Robert Costa, and Josh Dawsey, Trump Creates Political Storm with False
Claim on Puerto Rico Hurricane Death Toll, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2018)).
118 Monica Villamizar, Here’s Why Restoring Power to Puerto Rico is Taking So Long,
PBS NEWSHOUR TRANSCRIPT, (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/hereswhy-restoring-power-in-puerto-rico-is-taking-so-long. More than 450,000 people out of 1.5
million residents remained without power for four months after Maria made landfall. Id.
Moreover, even in the city of San Juan, the power grid was subject to blackouts for hours at a
time. Id.
119 2017
Poverty Rates in the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2018/comm/povertymap.pdf (last visited October 6, 2018) (using data from the 2017 American Community
Survey and the 2017 Puerto Rico Community Survey).
120 Pub. L. No. 115-56 (appropriating $15.25 billion for disaster relief for Harvey and Irma,
$7.4 billion of which went to the Disaster Relief Fund); Pub. L. No. 115-72 (appropriating
$18.67 billion for disaster relief for all three storms, up to $4.9 billion of which could be
provided to Puerto Rico in the form of a loan, but which has not been), and Pub. L. No. 115130 (Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6 (appropriating up to $91
billion to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands for disaster relief).
121 Charley E. Willison et al., Quantifying Inequities in US Federal Response to Hurricane
Disaster in Texas And Florida Compared With Puerto Rico, BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH (2019),
https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/4/1/e001191.full.pdf.
122 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, supra note 1.
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other disaster. This is more clearly politically motivated than some
earlier disaster relief funding decisions. This is demonstrated by
tweets from the current president, Donald J. Trump. In a series of
illustrative tweets on October 12, he stated that “‘Puerto Rico survived
the Hurricanes, now a financial crisis looms largely of their own
making.’ says Sharyl Attkisson. A total lack of . . .” 123 “. . .
accountability say the Governor. Electric and all infrastructure was
disaster before hurricanes. Congress to decide how much to
spend. . ..” 124 “. . . We cannot keep FEMA, the Military & the First
Responders, who have been amazing (under the most difficult
circumstances) in P.R. forever!” 125 and from the Presidential twitter
account, “Donald Trump says Puerto Rico can’t get aid
‘forever’.’” 126 Indeed, rather than finding ways to support and seek
to bring the country together and bring aid, he accused the media and
victims of being against those trying to help, “. . . want everything to
be done for them when it should be a community effort. 10,000
Federal workers now on Island doing a fantastic job” 127 and “Fake
News CNN and NBC are going out of their way to disparage our
great First Responders as a way to ‘get Trump.’ Not fair to FR or
effort!” 128
However, with respect to Hurricanes Irma and Maria, Congress
found supplemental appropriations far less urgent than its
appropriations for Harvey. However, it was still more timely than
relief for Sandy. The first appropriation was made on October 26,
2017, and was included in the second appropriation for recovery for
Hurricane Harvey. 129 This appropriation was made 36 days after
Hurricane Maria’s landfall, and 49 days after Irma’s first landfall in
the Virgin Islands. Nonetheless, there was a desperate need for the
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldJTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2017, 5:49 AM)
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/918428456869916672.
124 Id. (Oct. 12, 2017, 5:59 AM).
125 Id. (Oct. 12, 2017, 6:08 AM).
126 U.S. President News, (@President), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2017, 8:41 AM)
https://twitter.com/President/status/918501944380891136; Assoc. Press, Donald Trump Says
Puerto Rico Can’t Get Aid Forever, DENVER POST (Oct. 12, 2017) (linked from President’s
tweet) http://dpo.st/2zhMVcj.
127 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldJTrump) TWITTER (Sept. 30, 2017, 4:29 AM)
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/914089888596754434.
128 Id.
(Sept.
30,
2017,
4:48
AM)
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/914094625488502784.
129 Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017,
Pub. L. 115- 72, 1224 (Oct. 26, 2017).
123
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appropriation as there were already demonstrably inadequate
resources available for recovery.
Although the timing of appropriations suggests that the
survivors of all of the 2017 hurricanes received excellent treatment,
that is not the case. Not only were resources deployed more quickly
to the more heavily politically represented and affluent areas of Texas,
but the appropriations have been disproportionately weighted and
disbursed to those areas as well. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, territories which have no voting representation in Congress
and were devastated by Irma and Maria, received much lower
appropriations. Moreover, FEMA and other agencies have been much
slower to disburse aid to those areas. Further, the total amount of
appropriations relative to damage that has been made for subsequent
disasters continues to raise concerns with respect to the treatment of
future victims. While not discounting the importance of budgetary
constraints, it is a question of priorities.
A. Moving Forward
Recent major storm responses have demonstrated continuing
major inadequacies in FEMA planning for management coordination
of response efforts. Alleviating massive human suffering should not
be a matter of politics. Following Sandy, legislation to improve FEMA
was passed. 130 This was after legislation requiring restructuring and
improvements following the embarrassingly inadequate response to
Katrina.
Piecemeal legislation necessarily results in unequal treatment
of the survivors of various disasters. Vulnerable populations are those
most adversely impacted by slow appropriations, delayed
disbursements, and other inadequate relief and recovery responses. In
the face of a disaster, the disabled and poor are the ones who are unable
to evacuate. These people are also often renters and minorities. In the
long term because they tend to have fewer resources, they are less
likely to be able to afford relocation or repairs and replacement of
damaged or destroyed property. 131 Victims of some disasters have
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4 (Jan. 29, 2013).
These groups often overlap. Low income victims are less likely to receive adequate
assistance than higher income victims. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Javier Lezaun, Introduction,
3 in CATASTROPHE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE HUMANITARIAN IMPULSE (Sarat & Lezan Ed.
2009).
130
131
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fared better than victims of other disasters when it comes time for
Congress to act. This disparate benefit is a result of flaws in the design
of the disaster relief system and the degree to which it allows the
passage of time and politics to creep into the disaster relief and
recovery system, rather than designing the system to drive decisions
on the basis of need without regard to the place or timing of the
disaster.
Sandy survivors were the unfortunate victims of the fourth
costliest hurricane to make landfall in the U.S. and the vagaries of our
disaster relief system at a time when the political will to act was at an
all-time low. As this Article demonstrates, the Congressional response
represents a new low point, despite efforts to correct clear errors made
during the relief and recovery efforts in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
Although it was clear that systemic improvements were still needed
Sandy demonstrated areas in which systemic response to major
disasters has actually weakened. Further improvements must be made
in the interests of improving societal and distributional justice.
Two major changes are required. First, we must develop
substantial plans to mitigate the damage resulting from major disasters
and truly coordinate the response when major disasters occur, although
that is beyond the scope of this Article. Second, we must develop
consistently, certain relief and recovery plans to ensure that survivors
and communities are assured that following a major disaster both
vulnerable populations and communities will receive adequate aid to
rebuild and that no population or community will receive better
treatment by virtue of its greater political clout, its more favorable
location, or other ex-post considerations.
Nonetheless, it is clearly the trend. Indeed, some of the recent
bills to provide additional, supplemental funding for disaster relief
have been met with resistance because the Congressional Members
from other states do not believe that their constituents will support the
aid. 132 However, the because climate change is causing more frequent,
more costly disasters politically motivated, locally centered views on
disaster relief funding are short-sighted. Such a piecemeal approach
to disaster relief and recovery is also demonstrably harmful to many
of our citizens, is very inequitable and should be revisited.

132

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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B. Comparison of Responses
Disaster relief is a swinging pendulum. Not all systemic flaws
observed in response to Hurricane Katrina were addressed by
legislative changes to our disaster relief system, notwithstanding
comments made following Gustav that we might have been
overprepared. This was demonstrated by the response to Sandy. Once
again, the calls for change were immediate and loud. The response
was slow, inadequate, and again, a one-off.
The sole means of providing disaster relief for major disasters
continue to be supplemental appropriations. Therefore, survivors of
Sandy were at the mercy of Congress to pass legislation to provide
assistance. Congress did, but it took time.133 Moreover, the relief was
more limited than survivors of other disasters have received. Some
disasters have received temporary tax relief, 134 but that was not granted
for Sandy.
The federal response to Sandy demonstrated a shift that makes
even clearer the need to create a more consistent approach to disaster
relief. Sandy relief appropriations were slow to be made, putting
survivors at economic risk and creating housing instability because
recovery resources were unavailable. The delay resulting from
political distaste for funding aid primarily harmed those who were
displaced and unable to find assistance elsewhere. However, as an
unintended side effect, the New York City/New Jersey metropolitan
metro area, which is critical to the nation’s security, infrastructure, and
the economy, was placed at risk, without access to the billions of
dollars needed to repair essential infrastructure. This infrastructure is
needed not only locally, but important to national interests. Although
the Presidential Disaster Declaration was promptly made and the
physical response was improved compared to Katrina, the
appropriations were inadequate, and the bureaucratic challenges of
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–2, 127 Stat. 4 (Jan. 29,
2013).
134 Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA), Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat.
2016, 2027 (Sept. 23, 2005) (codified in scatted sections of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended) (providing limited tax relief benefitting victims of Hurricane Katrina and
their benefactors); Disaster Tax Relief and Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2017, 115th
Cong., Pub. L. No. 115-63, 131 Stat. 1167 (Sept. 29, 2017) (codified in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C. (the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended); 42 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.)
(providing limited tax relief for victims of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, their
benefactors, and the territories of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico; as well as providing for
extensions of certain unrelated expiring provisions of law).
133
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recovery returned the disaster relief system to a position that was worse
than prior to Katrina. This marks an inflection point, putting all
victims and society at risk.
V.

FUTURE RESPONSES

Trends in disaster response, relief, and recovery aid indicate
that the inequities are growing. Victims should not be placed in the
positions of receiving aid solely based on the way political winds
happen to be blowing. Although Sandy resulted in substantial federal
appropriations to repair and replace damaged infrastructure damage,
the money was slow to come and some remains unpaid. Although
Sandy’s damage was clearly apparent, Congressional appropriations
were delayed by unrelated concerns.
The current disaster relief system provides the utmost
discretion to FEMA, the President, and Congress. This leaves citizens
and states at a significant disadvantage in the face of a major disaster
like Sandy, Harvey, or Maria, and it puts the victims of a Maria at an
utter disadvantage to a Harvey, due to their relative position and
perceptions, notwithstanding their need or merit.
When Sandy blew in and left devastation in twelve states, the
survivors and public were to learn soon that not only had the federal
response system not been fixed, but in many important ways it was
worse. Although there was an adequate physical response, there was
little financial support in the short term. The treatment of Sandy
survivors and their communities represented a low point in federal
disaster appropriations.
The disparate treatment of victims of natural disasters results
in enormous hardship to individuals and communities. It also results
in substantial inequity. One constant in response to disasters is that
vulnerable populations receive substantially worse treatment, 135 which
is exacerbated by inconsistent treatment between incidents. The aid
available for relief and for recovery should not depend solely on when
in time a person becomes a victim, nor should it depend on how
functional Congress is either between its houses or in its relationship
with the President. The current ad hoc approach to determining how
much aid will be provided is, at best, a disservice to our citizens. It is
See generally, Elizabeth Pierson Hernandez, Twice Uprooted: How Government
Policies Exacerbate Injury to Low-Income Americans Following Natural Disasters, 14
SCHOLAR 219 (2011).
135
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essential to provide certainty to those who face a potential disaster. As
we all stand behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, 136 not knowing
whether we will be the victim or paying for the recovery effort, it is
unwise to leave open the possibility that we will suffer from the shortsightedness of our current system.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Both fortunately and unfortunately, it appears that Sandy
reflects an inflection point. Unfortunately, it took longer for Congress
to appropriate funds to provide for relief than it did following major
disasters before and after. Fortunately, it also appears that it marks a
change in the time in which the Federal Government will attempt to
get a response on the ground, absent significant political
considerations, such as a personal belief regarding the degree to which
the community and its members deserve relief. The clear disparity of
the treatment the communities and survivors experienced following
Sandy compared to Katrina, Harvey, and Maria regarding timing and
nature of appropriations and types of relief demonstrate this shift in
Congressional views on disaster relief that occurred with Sandy.
Permanent solutions are required. Sandy needs to be a point of
inflection and reflection on our funding for federal disaster relief.

136

See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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